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PRELUDE: TRIBUTE TO PROFESSOR JOSEPH W. MCKNIGHT
OSEPH W. McKnight was my first "connection" with our Law
School. This came about through five very independent sources.
First, was my Professor of Civil and Roman Law at the University of
Edinburgh, Scotland in the late 1960s, who, when he learned my family
had just moved to Dallas, strongly suggested I meet with Joe. Second,
was a very well-known senior academic from Oxford, who said the same
(Joe had been a Rhodes Scholar and had built a reputation as a common
law historian as to its reception under American law). Third, was a senior
Mexican legal scholar I met at the University of Michigan; apparently,
Joe was well-known in Mexican academic legal circles.
Fourth, was when I first came to Dallas in 1972 to work at the Locke
Purnell law firm, one of the oldest law firms in Texas. The senior partners
at the firm spoke very highly of Joe. What they shared in common with
Joe was their love of the law and of legal history. At that time, SMU had
the largest private international and comparative collection West of the
Mississippi and the Locke firm had the largest such collection of a law
firm in the Southwest (including a complete set of all English and Com-
monwealth law reports). I soon came to realize that Joe was the key "ac-
ademic operative" in building up the superb English and Commonwealth
law and Mexican-Spanish law collections at SMU.
The fifth source was two of the young law associates at the Locke firm,
with whom I started practice: both were SMU law alums. One now holds
high national office after becoming president of the Locke firm and presi-
dent of the Dallas and Texas Bars; the other is now a senior partner with
a major international and Texas law firm. As we shared time together, it
became very clear the deep, warm and humorous affection and respect
they had for Joe. As my close colleague, Roy Anderson, so succinctly
and aptly concluded at our faculty's 75th birthday celebration for Joe in
spring of 2001, Joseph W. McKnight is "unique" and "a one of a kind."
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So when I first met Professor McKnight informally in 1972 in the En-
glish and Commonwealth section of our library, I really was not sure what
exactly to expect. But the person I met then became one of the main
reasons I chose SMU as my lifelong "academic home." Not only was Joe
both an internationally-respected Common Law and Civil Law scholar,
he had helped make our library internationally-known. In addition, he
was most highly respected as a Texas lawyer, being the leading expert in
Texas family and community property laws. Even more significantly, he
was genuinely loved by his students.
As another of my close colleagues (Bill Dorsaneo) noted at Joe's"
75th," Professor McKnight provided the model for young SMU law
professors to aspire. In addition, in his own eccentric ways, he took a
very nurturing interest in the young SMU Professors, including, now, the
not-so-young such as Professor Emeritus Wingo and Professors Ander-
son, Bridge, Dorsaneo, Lisher, Schuman, Winship and myself, as well as
the now young (or younger) faculty members such as Professors Hanna,
Mayo and Pryor. For myself, I owe very much to Professor Joseph Webb
McKnight-personally and academically. Thank you so very much, Joe!
In greatly wanting to contribute a piece to this Symposium, I had initial
difficulty in where to start. As "brought home" to me at the international
and comparative law conference hosted by SMU in spring of 2001 to
honor Professor McKnight, Joe's legal contributions over the years are
indeed most significant and varied. However, in recently chatting with
Joe's co-senior faculty member, Professor Alan Bromberg, I came to real-
ize that though Joe is indeed "one-off" (as is Alan), he has been quite
traditional in terms of the type of legal academic our former Dean Storey
sought: an academic with an international/national stature, who was rec-
ognized as the best in one's area of expertise as to Texas law and practice
and who would make substantial contributions to SMU and its law center
and to the advancement of law, judicial and institutional reform, whether
through one's writings, influence on the Bar or in actually drafting of laws
and rules in one's area (be it state, federal or international).1 In reflect-
ing on this, and particularly on this later aspect of legal, institutional and
judicial reform, I concluded that a piece on my recent experiences with
banking law reform in Thailand might be appropriate.
In engaging in this law reform project in Thailand, one of the modern
genre of law reform efforts largely shaped by international institutions
and largely based on so-called "international standards and best prac-
tices," I soon came to realize that the "organic approach" to law reform
taken by Professor McKnight and some of his contemporaries required
considerable sensitivity to the related historical, cultural, and societal
1. In addition to Professors Bromberg and McKnight, names such as Professors Mas-
terson, Ray, Thomas, Galvin, Smith, Kennedy, Carl, Steele and MacLean also come to
mind; in the current SMU generation, individuals such as Professors Dorsaneo, Winship,




strands within the particular jurisdiction.2 Without incorporating such a
perspective (both retrospectively and prospectively), I have become con-
vinced that our modern global economic law reform efforts will fail the
same way as many of the foreign law implants of the 1950s and 1960s
failed.3
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decades, the international financial community has
been in the process of devising a "consensus" on standards and codes of
conduct and a related loose international institutional framework to
achieve financial stability and to develop robust financial systems on a
global basis. This consensus takes its form from the pronouncement of
such bodies as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the Interna-
tional Accounting Standards Committee ("IASC"), the International Or-
ganisation of Securities Commissions ("IOSCO"), the International
Association of Insurance Supervisors ("IAIS"), the Joint Forum on Fi-
nancial Conglomerates, and the Financial Stability Forum ("FSF"). 4
However, even the diligent application of these standards and codes does
not necessarily achieve an optimal outcome for reforming transitional
and emerging economies. For example, the former World Bank Chief
Economist, Joseph Stiglitz, who is critical of the "Washington consen-
sus," 5 has emphasized the need to contemplate various political, social
and cultural facets as well when embarking on significant economic and
financial sector reforms. 6
This article considers the legal and regulatory implications of adapting
"internationally accepted bank supervisory standards" for emerging and
transitioning economies and what criteria or preconditions are necessary
for the enforcement of these to be effective-using the recent reform ex-
periences of Thailand (as to which this author has had significant first-
hand experience) as a case study. For financial sector reforms to be effec-
tive, at a minimum, the legal infrastructure needs to be "enforceable." In
order to address the "realities" of this issue in Part IIA of this article, the
sui generis factors of Thailand in the formulation of its recent banking
2. See, e.g., the comparative law works of Professor's McKnight's close friends (each
of whom delivered papers at the Spring 2001 SMU conference honoring Joe), Professors
Alan Watson, Bernhard Grossfeld, Roberto MacLean and Hans Baade.
3. See generally JOSEPH J. NORTON, FINANCIAL SECTOR REFORM IN EMERGING
ECONOMIES (2000).
4. See, e.g., JOSEPH J. NORTON, DEVISING INTERNATIONAL BANK SUPERVISORY
STANDARDS (1995); Joseph J. Norton, A "New International Financial Architecture?"-Re-
flections on the Possible Law-Based Dimension, 33 INT'L LAW. 891 (1999); Mario Giova-
noli, A New Architecture for the Global Financial Market. Legal Aspects of International
Financial Setting, in INTERNATIONAL MONETARY LAW: ISSUES FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM
(Mario Giovanoli ed., 2000).
5. "Washington consensus" refers to the policy of the IMF and the US Treasury that
promotes, among other neo-classical economic thinking, market economies, capital ac-
count liberalization and effective external market access.
6. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Whither Reform? Ten Years of the Transition, Keynote address
at World Bank Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics (April 30, 1999).
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reforms are considered. Many of the problems that led to or exacerbated
the recent Thai financial crisis are infrastructural and cultural. 7 There-
fore, application of "international best practices," by itself, is not suffi-
cient. As well as substantial improvement of the legal and judicial
framework, societal cognisance of and adherence to rules, their enforce-
ment, and normative actions need to be encouraged. This involves a
long-term educational process that needs to penetrate the entire society
to enhance fairness and greater transparency and to provide greater eco-
nomic opportunities to a larger proportion of the society.
Part II will touch upon a few relevant sui generis factor as they became
key elements in the Thai reform processes. Sections IIB-E will more gen-
erally discuss and investigate the case of Thailand, taking into account the
specific IMF reforms for Thailand, and general prudential reform efforts
being undertaken by the Thai authorities. Part III will then analyze some
of the highlights of reform currently being considered and debated in the
Thai Parliament (still at August 2001) respecting the new proposed finan-
cial sector reform legislation. Part IV, more specifically, will consider the
critical issue of "effective enforcement." This article winds-up, in Part V,
with some modest concluding observations.
II. THE REALITY OF BANKING REFORM: THE CASE
OF THAILAND
Logically, "international best practices" are the accumulation of nu-
merous country analyses and experiences. As such, it would seem reason-
able that their due application and compliance would nurture a sound
"credit culture" and would minimize financial instability. However, the
reality of frequent instabilities that sometimes have "contagion effects,"
threatening the global financial system remains. This is not necessarily
the result of regulatory failure to adopt the internationally agreed upon
standards. Often, it is the result, in large part, of various sui generis fac-
tors that inhibit the effective adaptation by each country.8
Putting in place the "rules" (i.e., the law and related regulations) is the
relatively easy part of reform. Implementing them consistent with their
underlying rationale, yet also within the underlying domestic realities, is
crucial for successful reform. Unless the standards are adapted to suit the
national condition, the intended results often will not be achieved. In
such situations, this reform would only be a "paper based" achievement
7. Financial crises erupted in the markets of Asia in 1997 and engendered a broad
"contagion" effect. Thailand was the first country to be so affected. Abandoning its
pegged exchange rate for the Baht on July 2, 1997, it experienced a dramatic "free fall" of
its currency value. After Thailand agreed with the IMF on a "stand-by arrangement" in
October 1997, the reform of the Thai financial sector has taken place with the guidance of
the international community. See ALEXANDRE LAMFALUSSY, FINANCIAL CRISES IN
EMERGING MARKETS: AN ESSAY ON FINANCIAL GLOBALISATION AND FRAGILITY (2000).
8. See, e.g., Hon. Roberto G. MacLean, The Social Efficiency of Laws as an Element




accompanied by red tape regulatory formality.9
In the case of Thailand, which has been severely damaged by the recent
financial crisis, there have been various political, social and cultural issues
influencing the effective implementation of international standards.
Without paying adequate heed to these factors, the reform ultimately will
not reap the intended results. This would be extremely unfortunate for
the Thais and for the international community. The Thais have adhered
to and have tolerated the stringent IMF reform program that was initially
overly harsh on the national economy. If the current financial sector re-
forms are not sufficiently carried out with the intended robustness, the
Thai and international communities could be faced with further financial
instability.
This Part II will give consideration of the various sui generis factors
apropos to Thailand that would affect the implementation of the needed
financial sector reforms. Next in this section is a general discussion of
Thai banking, legal and regulatory reforms. Then, a more specific discus-
sion will be provided concerning the new Thai banking legislation, and in
the following Part, the specific issue of enforcement will be addressed, a
subject that has been problematic in all recent crisis-affected countries.
A. Sui GENERIS FACTORS OF THE THAI FINANCIAL SECTOR
Thailand is historically distinct from other Southeast Asian countries in
that it was never colonized. It has a monarchy which is highly and rever-
entially respected and which provides stability to Thai society. The mon-
arch is viewed as a benevolent ruler; and despite being a constitutional
monarch since 1932, the monarch will intervene where a significant public
interest might be involved.
Despite its numerous revolutions and coup d'6tats during the 2 0th cen-
tury, Thailand has failed to overhaul entirely its feudal social structure.
The current system still concentrates power in the hands of a few. As
such, the economic growth during the 1980s and early 1990s had not been
shared equally by the society. To the contrary, those who held power and
money have been the ones who benefited most and who still wield the
main political clout.
Although the current financial sector reform program is not directly
intended to improve the democratic institutions of Thailand, these socio-
political factors inevitably will impact the effectiveness of the reform.
1. The Social and Political Structures
The society of Thailand still carries, in various indirect ways, the "bag-
gage" of the feudal system, the Sakdi Na system, that burdened the poor
and benefited those well-born and well-connected. The Sakdi Na system
9. TULL TRAISORAT, THAILAND: FINANCIAL SECTOR REFORM AND THE EAST
ASIAN CRISIS 45 (Kluwer Law International 2000). Cf IMF Concludes Post-Program
Monitoring Discussion on Thailand, IMF PIN No. 00/110 (Dec. 20, 2000).
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originated in the mid 14th century until it was formally abolished in 1932,
with the transition to the constitutional monarch.
Under the Sakdi Na system, the monarch owned land, labor and other
economic resources. The concept of private land ownership was not pre-
sent under this arrangement, but the monarch could grant aristocrats the
right of usufructus (i.e., the temporary right to use and benefit from
land). The amount of land would reflect the power, rights, and obliga-
tions of the aristocrat. The Sakdi Na system was systematic in un-
derdeveloping the commercial and business framework, and thus creating
a mutual dependence between the aristocrats and merchants. The eco-
nomic surplus was taxed away by the aristocrats and then by the mon-
arch. The commoners saw their lives as predestined according to the
prevalent Buddhist and Hindu thinking.
This feudal system further hindered the development of a broad and
independent middle class. The middle-class, which is the driving force of
modern economic development, was not able to use its creative abilities
for its own benefit, being forced to work their mandatory periods for
their patron.
Moreover, the Chinese in Thailand were permitted by the monarch and
aristocracy to take over the business vacuum, sending their profits back to
their home towns in China. The Chinese merchants, in fact, were given
special status in Thailand. Since they were foreigners, they were not sub-
ject to the Sakdi Na, and taxation was much lower than for Thais-it is
said to be as low as by 36 times.10 Being traditionally entrepreneurial, the
Chinese had excellent trading skills. Because trade was monopolized by
the monarch, they needed to conduct business under the auspices of an
aristocrat. A patron-client relationship between the aristocrats and Chi-
nese businessmen was formed in which the Chinese received protection
from the aristocrats, and the aristocrats received pecuniary benefits.
Once the Chinese secured a position in the Thai economy, they were able
to tap other avenues of Thai society.
This is a basis for the use of "connections," a practice prevalent in
Asian societies. Once the Chinese obtained an aristocrat-patron, they
were embraced in the monopolistic Thai governmental business world,
and could win bids for governmental work, such as collecting taxes. They
also were given social titles, which was believed to solidify their alle-
giance to the monarch. This social system of "inter-dependence" and
"connections" remains a main conduit for doing business in Thailand re-
sulting in concentration of economic power in the hands of a privileged
few.
The power of commercial banks which has been controlled (directly or
indirectly) by government factions or an elite group of private business
families, is especially pronounced. Companies in Thailand typically ac-
quire funding through the banking system. Thus, banks have a creditor
10. See TRAISORAT, supra note 9, at 53.
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interest in these businesses. Further, Thai companies form conglomerates
through cross-holding of shares or cross-directorates. Banks have a cru-
cial role in assisting the financing of these groups. This interconnection is
strengthened by the intra-marriage among the business elites. All this
has created a concentration of economic power in Thailand that is en-
hanced with every business deal.
The extraordinary power of the Thai business sector has made it ex-
tremely influential over the government as well. Businesses invite mem-
bers of the government and bureaucracy as directors to protect their
business interests. This gives the company increased "negotiation lever-
age." The patron receives economic benefit in return for the services
rendered.
Political instability has plagued Thailand since its revolution in 1932.
After the 1932 revolution that turned the monarchy from an absolute to a
constitutional one, the period from 1938 witnessed the rise of Thai na-
tionalism under the rule of the dictator, Luang Pibulsongkram. Foreign
merchants such as the Chinese needed to buy protection from the govern-
ment. Then the military regime took hold in 1957 after a coup d'dtat.
The military split into two fractions, causing continuous coup d'6tats be-
tween the two sides. Then the civilian protest in 1973 caused a military
massacre of civilians, which eventually led to a democratically elected ci-
vilian government.
The Thai monarch has had a special role in this unstable political envi-
ronment, creating a national impression of political stability and con-
tinuity in spite of its political instability. As with all modern monarchs,
the Thai monarch cannot boast of past deeds to maintain the throne.
However, the monarch, in persona, has been viewed as a benevolent ruler
throughout the feudal system.' I Particularly, since 1932, the monarch has
been a most constructive force in political, educational and cultural devel-
opment. The respect that people express towards the incumbent King
Bhumibol is immense. Since he came to reign in 1946, there have been
seventeen coups and twenty-two prime ministers, but only one King. He
has acted with consistency and selflessness, being a psychological and
moral anchor to the Thai people.12
On a more positive side, the King also has been a moderating power on
scheming politicians, bureaucrats and generals. The stability and the
pride that the Thai people have in their King have also led to pride in the
social and cultural heritage of the Thais. They did not have the colonial
powers interfering in their affairs as did many developing countries. 13 As
such, they retained pride and dignity in their own system, applying certain
modifications to adapt to the changing time.
11. Id. at 47.
12. William Barnes, Thai Change Likely to Bypass Revered King (1999) FINANCIAL
TIMES, Dec. 4, 1999, at 6.
13. This is not strictly correct, because Thailand was forced to open in ports to foreign-
ers after the Bowring Treaty was signed with the English in 1855. It was an unfair treaty
that necessitated Thailand to require certain modern structures to be renegotiated.
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However, if the argument of "preservation of the traditional system"
were used to retain the undemocratic system in Thailand, this would be
most unfortunate. The negative effects that the old system imposes are
socially and economically detrimental.
2. The Legislative Process
Today, Thailand boasts a democratic system and institutions. However,
the vibrancy of these have been adversely affected, at times, by a variety
of historical remnants.
The Thai legislature comprises the Lower House and Senate. While
the Lower House is an elected body, the Prime Minister, until most re-
cently, constituted the Senate with appointees. As a result, the Senate
has been dominated by ex-bureaucrats and businessmen. Both houses
traditionally have been subject to vote-buying and influence-peddling,
producing corrupt and unstable governments, though recent legislative
and governmental enforcement efforts are now being made to address
these abuses.
Because the legislature largely consists of the "connected" people of
Thai society, who have been the principle power-holders over the centu-
ries, the legislative processes were and are often subject to delays or op-
position to any legislation contrary to a particular business' vested
interest. Businessmen are able to influence governmental policy-making
or legislation through these "connections" as well. The result has been a
legislature that does not always act for the public interest, but often for
vested interests.14
There are numerous examples of such unwarranted and detrimental
delays. The most significant for this analysis is the failures, on two recent
occasions, to establish a deposit insurance institution. It is generally ac-
cepted in Thailand that some form of deposit insurance scheme would be
in the Thai public interest, especially for those with little savings. Also an
appropriate deposit insurance scheme could help prevent bank runs that
may cause failure of the depository institution. Nevertheless, its estab-
lishment would cost the financial institutions the insurance premiums and
moreover would prevent the government from formulating generous bail-
out schemes. 15 Thus, the efforts to develop a deposit insurance institu-
tion have not yet been successful; though a draft Deposit Insurance Act
("DIA") has been prepared by the Bank of Thailand ("BoT") and the
Thai Ministry of Finance ("MoF"). This draft deposit insurance law may
at last be fruitful on its third attempt, but probably not for another two
years.
As mentioned above, the concentration of economic power is consider-
able in Thailand, with large conglomerates running or involved in most
major businesses. The government has been attempting to dilute this




concentration since 1979 by preventing the inclusion of a depository insti-
tution into these conglomerates; however, these efforts have often been
thwarted by indirect and disguised "nominee" ownerships. In addition,
while cross-holdings between commercial banks, finance companies and
securities companies, and between those and other companies is re-
stricted to prohibit further concentration of power in the finance and
banking sector,16 as a result of legal compromise, this restriction of other
companies controlling financial institutions was not applied to those
banks already in operation at the time of enactment. 17
Even, on some occasions, certain politicians have expressed their out-
right opposition to orders issued by the MoF or BoT. For example, when
the MoF and the BoT ordered the Nakorn Luang Thai Bank to increase
its capital within forty-five days in 1987, the Select Committee on Eco-
nomic Affairs announced that the forty-five days deadline was unjusti-
fied, and requested relevant authorities to provide an extension of
another six months.' 8 The media was also utilized on this occasion, by
criticizing the government for its "harsh" decision.
In a more recent event, when the bankruptcy law was being amended
in March 1998, the legislation was unduly held-up in the Senate for sev-
eral months. These legislative amendments would make it more difficult
for a few creditors to hold up the insolvency process and simpler for se-
cured creditors to realize upon debtor's assets. However, as explained
above, the Senate consists of a number of prominent businessmen and
they are sometimes instrumental in "foot dragging."' 19
The prospect of such delays is slowly changing, due in large measure to
the new Thai Constitution that was introduced in 1997. The 200 members
of Senate are now subject to direct election, the first of which was con-
ducted on March 4, 2000. In order to root out the "vote-buying," influ-
ence-peddling, corruption, fraud, and nepotism, the Constitution
empowers the Election Commission to suspend any candidate suspected
of breaching the election rules. Due to the confusion and unclear rules,
the Election Commission, to date, has not been as effective as intended. 20
For instance the recent re-election of the Senate seats that were consid-
ered fraudulently secured was conducted in late April 2000, but there is
still the possibility of illegal transactions involved in that vote. Yet, in the
course of this recent Senate election, the power granted to the Election
Commission is encouraging, symbolizing a determination to enforce the
rules.21
16. Banks, finance companies, and credit foncier companies are not permitted to hold
more than 10 percent of shares among themselves. A commercial bank is not permitted to
hold shares of other commercial banks. Commercial Banking Act, 1962, § 12(6) (Thai].),
amended by the Emergency Decree 1985, (Thail.).
17. Commercial Banking Act, 1962, § 22 (Thail.).
18. See TRAISORAT, supra note 9, at 67.
19. Broken Thais, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 18, 2000.
20. Mired in Money Politics, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 4, 2000.
21. Ted Bardacke, Election to First Thai Senate Declared a Draw, FINANCIAL TIMES,
Mar. 6, 2000, at 6.
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These mixed, but changing political dynamics, undoubtedly will con-
tinue to influence the final shape and effect of the currently pending Thai
banking reform legislation.
3. The Administrative Process
The BoT sits in a rather precarious position. On the one hand, it has
been relatively unfavorably treated by the Thai system, being hierarchi-
cally placed under the MoF. When there is disagreement between the
Court of Directors, the decision-making body of the BoT, and the Gover-
nor of the BoT, the Minister of Finance had the power to make the final
decision. 22 Further, and crucially, while the MoF is ultimately responsi-
ble for the conduct of prudential supervision of commercial bank, finance
companies and credit foncier companies,23 the MoF authorizes the BoT
by delegation to carry out the supervision by administrative assignment. 24
This administrative assignment makes the BoT fully responsible for mis-
takes arising from supervision.
Yet, on the other hand, the BoT consists of highly qualified economists,
many educated in the US.2 5 A job at the BoT is prestigious, and well
paid. But, the Governor is not necessarily so, since he/she is appointed
by the Prime Minister. During the recent financial crisis, the Governor of
the BoT was dismissed, taking formal responsibility for unsuccessfully us-
ing the country's international reserves to defend the currency.26 This
being said, the current Governor, Mr. Mongol Sonakul, has been able to
personally exert considerable political independence.
A bureaucracy's power ultimately rests upon the extent of its influence
over its constituency (for the BoT, over the financial institution commu-
nity). But, because, historically, Thai financial institutions (and those be-
hind these institutions) have had enormous political power and
"connections," it has been difficult for the BoT to bring about an effec-
tive supervisory regime, despite the powers it has been granted.
Further, as will be discussed below, what Thai administrative process
has existed has rested largely on bureaucratic discretion and not on a
developed rule-based administrative process.
4. The Enforcement Process
Historically, enforcement of economic laws and regulations tradition-
ally has not been strong in Thailand. Because the owners or controllers
22. Bank of Thailand Act, 1942, § 17 (Thail.).
23. Commercial Banking Act, 1962, § 4 (Thail.).
24. Finance Minister letter to the Governor of BoT, RE: Assignment to the BoT to
Supervise Commercial Banks According to the Commercial Banking Law of April 27,
1962.
25. Economists who join the BOT are given the opportunity to obtain a Ph.D. in eco-
nomics overseas, but are contractually bound to employment with BOT depending on the
length of studies.
26. Nukul Commission Report Analysis and Evaluation on Facts Behind Thailand's
Economic Crisis (March 31, 1998), in TRAISORAT, supra note 9, at 373.
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of banks and corporates have substantial political power, the regulatory
possibility of revocation of license or cessation of operations arising from
non-compliance does not intimidate or restrain business. Further, in the
Thai business community, formation of private cartels is widespread, de-
terring the competitive advantage of running a sound business. 27
The recent financial crisis was an instance where the lack of "safe and
sound" business practices and regulatory non-compliance by banks re-
sulted in a vast amount of nonperforming loans as well, contributing sig-
nificantly to the overall vulnerability of the financial sector. The BoT's
regulation and supervision had been frequently ignored or influenced by
politicians, or were countermanded or modified by the MoF to accommo-
date the commercial interests, and not necessarily to pursue financial
safety and the public interests.
On various occasions, the BoT, itself, decided not to act or has seen its
modest efforts to act rebuffed by the courts.2 8 For example, in 1989, the
BoT made an attempt to control credit allocation to the property market
by "moral suasion," but was ignored by the commercial banks.29 The
Military Bank was regarded as one of the most unsound banks in Thai-
land, with low quality and connected assets, but was shielded from the
remedial supervisory and prudential policies of the BoT due to the mili-
tary influence. 30
After a series of bank crises in the mid 1980s, some attempts were
made to boost the enforcement power of the BoT to rectify the unsound
practices of banks. In 1985, the BoT was given prosecution power, per-
mitting the BoT to bring charges against bank mismanagement as if the
BoT were the damaged party. 31 However, it is doubtful whether this
power has ever been used effectively. On numerous occasions, the BoT
has politically compromised the exercise of prosecution against bank
management or opted not to proceed for the sake of "preserving investor
confidence. " 32
Another factor that would have influenced the actions of the BoT is
the rarity of bringing financial cases to court in Thailand. 33 The judicial
process in the commercial, business and financial areas is extremely
weak, 34 and those who have prosecuted powerful people in Thailand gen-
erally have fared badly.35 So far, as of January 2000, not one Thai finan-
27. Id. at 64.
28. Id. at 67.
29. Id. at 129.
30. Id. at 127.
31. Commercial Banking Act, 1962, § 18 (Thail.), as amended by the Emergency De-
cree, 1985, (Thail.).
32. See TRAISORAT, supra note 9, at 44, 84-90.
33. Id. at 44.
34. Broken Thais, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 18, 2000.
35. The governor of BoT, Chatu Mongol Sonakul, commenting on the progress of his
prosecution team against past fraudulent practices. Ted Bardacke, Thai Unease Over
Cronyism to be Aired, FINANCIAL TIMES, Dec. 15, 1999, at 12.
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cier has been imprisoned. 36
Some hopeful measures, however, have been taken. Thailand enacted
a formal reorganization process in 1998, and amended its bankruptcy law
in March 1998, establishing a new bankruptcy court. 37 This might en-
courage creditors to request the courts to intervene in dealing with stub-
born debtors. Further, the BoT is actively prosecuting bank management
conducting illegal practices. This has recently resulted in the extradition
of one high-profile business elite from the UK. 38
B. IMPLEMENTING FINANCIAL AND BANKING SECTOR REFORM: IMF
CONCERTED REFORM PROGRAM
As mentioned above, following the financial crisis that hit Thailand in
1997, the authorities of Thailand agreed on a "standby agreement" with
the International Monetary Fund ("IMF") in October 1997. As the crisis
hit other Asian countries, the IMF program came to include not only
macroeconomic policy measures, but structural measure as well. Thai-
land had been pursuing a relatively sound macroeconomic policy, and the
main causes of its crisis were seen as the structural rigidities and deficien-
cies of the system.
The Thai financial and banking sector was especially targeted for re-
form by the IMF. Technically, the IMF reform influence comes in two
main ways: (i) through Letters of Intent ("LOIs") agreed to by the appli-
cant country seeking an IMF "facility," with such facilities subject to IMF
"conditionality" reflected in the LOI (as it may be amended or revised,
from time to time), and (ii) through the technical assistance programs
furnished by the IMFs Monetary and Economic Department ("MAE")
and often also by the World Bank. These two "prongs" of the IMF struc-
tural reform efforts run parallel to each other and in theory (at least) in a
coordinated manner.
The main points agreed upon by the Thai government and the IMF on
financial sector reform are the following:
- To restore investor confidence in the Thai banking and financial
system;
- To restore the solvency, profitability, and liquidity of the broader
financial system;
- To enhance foreign ownership in domestic financial institutions;
To effect medium-terrm practices in order to strengthen the struc-
ture of the financial system and enhance incentives for increased
market discipline; and
- To require shareholders and creditors of subordinated debts to
bear the burden of their losses.39
36. Id.
37. Broken Thais, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 18, 2000.
38. Ted Bardacke, Thai Unease Over Cronyism to be Aired, FINANCIAL TIMES, Dec.
15, 1999, at 12.




In this context, the Thais committed themselves to amending their
Commercial Banking Act ("CBA"), The Act Regulating the Finance and
Securities Business, Bankruptcy Act and the Civil and Commercial Code.
The Bank of Thailand Act ("BTA") is also being amended to strengthen
the BoT's function. The draft BTA, draft CBA and prudential regula-
tions are discussed in detail below. A draft Deposit Insurance Act
("DIA") is considered an integral part of this reform package, but both
the IMF and BoT/MoF have come to practically realize that the passage
of a DIA is still a year or two off.
The IMF financial sector reform program has consisted of six specific
measures. The first is the separation of viable and unviable financial in-
stitutions to regain investor confidence in the financial system. A total of
fifty-eight financial institutions were suspended and closed by December
1997. Also, a blanket guarantee of all deposits was issued by the MOF
and BOT in August 1997. Funds from safer institutions were recycled
into those institutions losing deposits; but, this effort was unsuccessful in
the end because of the high risk in lending to unsound banks and the
"moral hazard" that might occur.
Second, existing banks and other depository institutions were required
to recapitalize and to enhance loan loss provisioning. Foreign ownership
was encouraged by the relaxation of restrictions on shareholding by for-
eign investors (though, in reality, foreign banks are not provided true
"national treatment" or "effective market access").
Third, the Financial Restructuring Authority ("FRA") was established
in October 1997 to restructure and to monitor the fifty-eight financial
institutions suspended. Two of the institutions were able to reopen given
the approval of their rehabilitation plan, but the others were closed and
liquidated.
Fourth, the Asset Management Corporation ("AMC") and the
Radhanasin Bank ("RAB") were established in October 1997 to partici-
pate in the auction of the assets with other private bidders. The AMC
purchases the lowest quality assets, acting as "the buyer of last resort. '40
The RAB will on the other hand bid for the highest quality assets and
operate on strict commercial principles, assisting the restructuring
process. 41
Fifth, the BOT was empowered to address financially distressed finan-
cial institutions more readily through the amendment of the banking
law. 4
2
Sixth, in order to reduce moral hazard, authorities prompted that they
will not provide unjustified guarantees or bail outs of insolvent banks.
40. Third Letter of Intent to the IMF from MoF Minister and BoT Governor, Attach-
ment, Memorandum of Economic Policies of The Royal Thai Government, Feb. 24, 1998,
para. 4.
41. Id.
42. See TRAISORAT, supra note 9, chs. 4, 5.
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To ensure that these measures are adequately carried out, the Thai au-
thorities have drafted three pieces of major legislations (referred to
above) to make permanent the various reforms and also to ensure that
sanctions are applied when non-compliance is determined. As opposed
to the other crises-affected countries, Thailand has taken the position that
it would "own" the reforms by taking the lead in any legislative move-
ments. Thus, it has taken a longer period of time for the Thais to draft
and to process the necessary legislation. The three pieces of legislation
are currently (as of August 2000) under review by the Council of State
(the former Judicial Committee), having been approved by the BoT and
MoF. Formal submission to Parliament will await the election of a new
Parliament and Government in late 2000.
The changes that are envisaged by this legislation are explored below.
However, for present purposes, some of the main areas that would be
improved through the legislation (if enacted in substantially the same
form as submitted to Parliament) are the following:
- Deterrence of unsound insider/affiliate/nominee transactions;
- Strengthening of enforcement;
- Enhancement of supervision;
- Stricter application of prudential requirements;
- Application of prompt corrective actions;
- Improvement of financial institutions "governance;" and
- Better treatment of accountants and accounting standards.
One under appreciated beneficial effect of the IMF-Thai financial sec-
tor reform program has been its influence on enhanced governmental and
IFI transparency. In the past, IMF reform programs were conducted
largely in secrecy (confidentiality) and the reforms were largely imposed
top-down. In addition, in general, the policy-making and decision-mak-
ing process of central banks, bank supervisors and IFIs were largely non-
transparent, "less markets or governments be unduly disrupted."
With the recent reform efforts, both the IFIs and governments (starting
with Thailand) have come to a consensus that disclosure is more benefi-
cial than detrimental. This had had a substantial effect upon the LOI and
reform processes and is significantly transforming the culture of central
banks (worldwide) and IFIs to being more open, transparent, responsive,
cooperative and accountable institutions.
C. THE PROPOSED NEW BTA 43
A significant improvement achieved through the proposed amend-
ments to the BTA is that the BoT would become the primary and inde-
pendent bank supervisor. Currently, the BoT is not statutorily defined as
43. References in this article to the proposed BTA and CBA are to Draft No. 7 of July
1999 as prepared by the BoT and submitted to the MoF. Additional amendments have
been made and are being considered as the bill goes through the Thai parliamentary




the "supervisor", but merely acts as such through an appointment by the
MoF. This is not sufficient to legally justify the role of the BoT and to
grant it effective powers to enforce its regulation against financial
institutions.
As explained above, the management of Thai financial institutions
have traditionally wielded strong political power. To enable action
against non-compliant financial institutions, immunity for BoT executives
is also most desirable, if not necessary.
A major concern that arises from any increased independence for the
BoT is how accountability will be achieved. The proposed legislation
does not set out clear guidelines as to who and how the BoT will report
on and account for its activities. In practice, it is envisaged that the BoT
will report to a committee comprised of persons who are knowledgeable
of monetary policy (no mention of supervisory policy). This committee in
fact will be comprised mostly of MoF officials. Although there may be a
lack of appropriate people to fill this role, assigning the majority to MoF
officials would defeat the purpose of the law. Either a committee more
independent of political influence and administrative hierarchy and more
broader based, or reporting to a parliamentary committee would be more
democratically justified.
The relationship between the BoT and the MoF continues to be an
uneasy one. While the reforms since the recent financial crisis has clari-
fied the role of the central bank, the MoF is still heavily involved in the
business of the BoT. As explained above, the committee through which
the BoT is to be accountable will comprise a number of MoF officials.
Moreover, draft legislation would have to be scrutinized and approved by
the MoF in order for it to proceed to the Parliamentary Judiciary Com-
mittee. In a recent incident, a public dispute erupted between the Gover-
nor of the BoT and the Minister of Finance over how to resolve the losses
incurred by the Financial Institutions Development Fund.44
Further, the decision of monetary policy lies in the sole hand of the
Governor of BoT. This is in the process of being transferred to a Mone-
tary Policy Board. This is an attempt by the BoT towards adopting an
"inflation target" approach. It intends to create a system where inflation
is stabilized by an independent board determining the level of interest
rates.
In a recent speech by the former BoT Governor, attempts to truly
44. The Financial Institutions Development Fund ("FIDF") comprises contributions
made from Thai financial institutions and BOT. Since Thailand did not have a deposit
insurance scheme, FIDF was used to provide financial support for banks and finance com-
panies in distress. The dispute is over how to resolve the staggering losses of 280 billion
baht. MOF wants the foreign exchange reserve merged with two other accounts so the
excess profits could be used to offset the debt. Since the exact losses from the FIDF is not
clear there is a possibility of exhausting the central bank's reserves, and further, it would
result in the central bank monetizing the fiscal debt. How to finance the losses was dis-
cussed in a meeting convened in May 2000. See Time to Let Cool Heads Prevail, BANGKOK
PosT, Apr. 27, 2000.
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strengthen the Thai financial system were emphasized. 45 A strong deter-
mination to improve the operation of its monetary policy and subsequent
robustness of the economy is essential. Unless the issues that are ad-
dressed by the relevant legislation are administered and enforced with a
true understanding of their respective (but interrelated) purposes, it
might be difficult to achieve the intended results.
D. THE PROPOSED NEW CBA
Notwithstanding the reform efforts to make the BoT "independent" (a
matter proving to be raising considerable debate in Parliament) both as
to monetary policy and as to bank supervision, the MoF maintain respon-
sibility for enforcing the provisions of the Commercial Banking Act.46
Despite this legal provision under the proposed new CBA, the actual en-
forcement would be conducted by the BoT. This creates a gap between
where the statutory power lies and who actually enforces these powers.
The incentive for the enforcer to effectively enforce could be compro-
mised, as could be a financial institution's regulatorees' incentive to com-
ply. For true reform, it seems imperative that the statutory power and
practical enforcement are consolidated so that the incentive to enforce
and to comply are not impaired.
One way to resolve this separation of power is by exchanging a Memo-
randum of Understanding ("MoU") between the BoT and the MoF to
ensure that enforcement is "contractually" delegated to the BoT. The
MoF and the BoT currently exchange a MoU to ascertain the scope of
the BoT's bank supervision. 47 Although enforcement is, in practice, con-
ducted by the BoT, a MoU could formalize and clarify the enforcement
process of the BoT.
Such an MoU could define the legal power of the instruments available
to BoT against non-compliant financial institutions. The MoF being the
statutory administrator of the financial sector, a procedure could be es-
tablished where the BoT's regulation-setting power is "semi-automati-
cally" approved by a board comprising the MoF officials and independent
advisers. The Money Market Committee that is being established might
be able to take up this role to ensure the soundness of the BoT
regulations.
Of note for this article, the BoT established a Litigation Department in
1998 in order to address the increasing need for legally effective enforce-
ment clauses, and has been able to tackle some of the illegal activities
through liaison with the Public Investigator's Office. 48 Through its recent
45. Chatu Mongol Sonakul, Maintaining Monetary Discipline in the Face of Rising
Public Debt, Address at Merrill Lynch's Asia Pacific Investor Conference (Apr. 18, 2000).
46. Draft Commercial Banking Act, 1999 (Thail.) [hereinafter CBAJ.
47. CBA, § 121 (Thail.).
48. In a recent case, the BoT caught Pin Chakkapak who owned Finance One and had
fled to the UK. He was caught through extradition procedures carried out in London. Ted
Bardocke, THAI UNEASE OVER CRONYISM TO BE AIRED, FINANCIAL TIMES, Dec. 15, 1999,
at 12. As of Sept. 2001, this case is still working its way through the UK judicial system.
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action, the BoT and its Litigation Department have set an example that
non-compliance will no longer be tolerated.
This will include application of a modified "prompt corrective actions"
("PCA") scheme as proposed to be engrafted into the Banking Act. Spe-
cifically, the proposed CBA (as submitted to the MoF) states that finan-
cial institutions will be subject to PCA if a certain capital level is not
maintained. However, the "tripwires" of capital levels that trigger PCA
are not clear and the gradation of PCA is also not submitted. With a
"scaling" of PCA, the incentive to correct unsound operations should be
stronger since the negative impact will rise with each decrease of capital
level. CAMEL, which is the international best practice for bank supervi-
sion, defines three levels of capital after the adequate capital level is not
satisfied. Financial institutions are thus aware at what level, what action
will be taken and can take preventive actions when they enter a lower
CAMEL rating.
E. RELATED PRUDENTIAL REGULATIONS: SOME
SUMMARY COMMENTS
The BoT is in the process of vigorously improving its supervisory meth-
ods. The most recent Governor (who maintained a high-level of indepen-
dence and public respect, being a member of the Royal Family) had been
especially active, encouraging various measures to ensure this. First and
foremost, a training school for supervisors has been established. Supervi-
sors will have to attend five prescribed courses and pass a final examina-
tion in order to become a fully-fledged examiner. 49 Although there is no
deadline as to by when one has to pass these final exams, this require-
ment will certainly apply pressure on those who do not succeed in pass-
ing. Since this Governor was recently "sacked" by the Government, a
"vacuum" appears to be setting into BoT proactively.
The BoT is phasing in the application of "CAMEL ratings" for finan-
cial institutions in a much more comprehensive manner. CAMEL (de-
rived from long-standing U.S. supervisory/examination practices) has
been Thailand's benchmark for supervision, but had not been actually
achieved. Risk analysis mainly focused on credit risk until recently. In
order to address risks such as market risk and hedging risk, detailed scru-
tiny is being made from various areas of the finance industry (domestic
and foreign) to derive a greater and more relevant sophistication in its
risk evaluation methods.
Along with this development, the BoTs Supervisory Department has
revised its Supervisory Manual. The old Manual had only looked into
credit risk and the quality of securities. The new Manual considers proce-
dures of transactions and back-office operations that were formerly ne-
The Thai government lost its extradition attempts before the English High Court, but, is
now reformulating a different judicial strategy.
49. Depending on how long one has been an examiner, one is given concession to
some of the courses.
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glected. The new Manual will be disseminated widely so as ensure
financial institutions understand the methodology of BoT examination.
However, the publication of this new Manual has been delayed due to
an internal dispute on its final contents. This reflects some of the contin-
uing weaknesses in the internal structure of the BoT, itself, which should
be addressed. Whereas staff members who have long worked at the BoT
believe in their ability to conduct supervision and to carry out monetary
policy, they are not sufficiently aware of the politics involved in their de-
cisions. This can be of concern since the central bank needs to be able to
account for its policies not only to those who are knowledgeable of mone-
tary policy, but also to the general public which is affected by this policy
and to the legislature.
Another area which the BoT has especially addressed is asset classifica-
tion and loan loss provisioning. Thailand has had the problem of not be-
ing able to ascertain the amount of non-performing loans (NPL). This
has inhibited the government from gaining a true understanding of the
economic situation. Asset classification is being addressed through vari-
ous avenues. Relevant re-stating regulations have been issued.50 The
new supervisory Manual will also address this problem.
A further critical area of prudential concern under the proposed new
CBA will be extensive treatment of "nominee" situations and of insider
and affiliated transactions.
III. SELECTIVE GENERAL COMMENTS ON THAILAND'S
PROPOSED NEW BANKING LEGISLATION AND
RELATED SUBJECT-MATTER
A. PERSPECTIVE ON THAILAND REFORM EFFORTS
From the mid-1980s through 1996, Thailand was viewed by most inter-
national experts (including leading international and regional financial
organizations) as a "model" for emerging market/developing country re-
form, and these views were generally accurate. The significant cracks in
the Thai economic infrastructure, particularly in the financial sector area,
which manifested in 1997 and facilitated the East Asian Financial Crises,
were largely unforeseen by the domestic and international experts.
Following the events of 1997, the Thai Government, especially through
its MoF and BoT, has very responsibly worked, internally and in coopera-
tion with the IFIs, to undertake significant economic infrastructural re-
forms. These reform efforts are based on the realization that reform
needs not simply to embrace the "macroeconomic," but also relevant
"microeconomic" aspects. These latter reforms have concentrated on the
Thai financial sector and included major legal infrastructural reforms.
50. Bank of Thailand, Regulations on Loan Classification, Provisioning, Suspension of
Interest and Other Related Requirements (1998) Regulation No. 15/1998 (July 1), and
Amendment in Asset Classification and Provision as a Result of Debt Restructuring (1999)
Regulation 17/1999 (April 1).
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These current financial sector legal reforms, as mentioned in Part II
above, include the CBA, BTA (both now before Parliament, even after its
submission two years ago) and a pending draft DIA.
Once again, perspective is needed. On a relative and regionally com-
parative basis, the Thai banking and other financial law reforms of the
1980s and early 1990s were relatively "progressive" and "modern." In
fact, it is clear that at least as of the early 1990s, the MoF and BoT were
increasingly moving towards consistency with international best practices
of the time.
Two other additional perspectives are germane. First, since the 1980s
and even now, Thailand has been under significant external pressures to
"liberalize" and "internationalize" its economy and financial sector. Ef-
forts in these regards, without concurrent counter-balancing measures to
"manage" such external pressures, proved to be a major contributing fac-
tor in the crises beginning.in 1997. Hindsight indicates that meaningful
and effective legal and prudential reforms in the financial sector should
have been more diligently emphasized by the experts and the Thai
Government.
Second, effective financial sector legal infrastructural reform cannot be
achieved simply by statutory revisions, but necessarily entail much
broader and deeper dimensions, including a fundamental appreciation of
the following:
- The societal rationale for adopting a "rule-based" approach;
- A full appreciation that a rule-based approach is not a "rule-by-
law approach," but a "rule-of law approach;"
- A "rule-of-law approach" requires a high degree of transparency
and accountability for all involved levels of government (execu-
tive, administrative, legislative and judicial);
- Inherent in the "rule of law" approach are the notions of "proce-
dural due process" and independent "judicial review;" and
- A meaningful and effective "rule-based" approach should balance
a number of internal tensions such as: rule-orientation versus gov-
ernmental discretion; transparency versus confidentiality needs;
globalization pressures versus internal domestic needs; and inter-
national standardization/convergence versus domestic political
realities.
In reviewing the Thai reform program in this manner, the enactment of
the proposed new CBA is a most desirable and necessary first step of a
much longer and deeper legal reform process-a process that will need to
transform traditional political, administrative, judicial and societal "ways
of doing business."
B. THE PROPOSED CBA AS A "CRISIS-ORIENTED" STATUTE
The reforms embraced by the proposed CBA are naturally reactive to
many of the perceived vulnerabilities generated by, and causes associated
with, the 1997 financial crises. In this sense, the CBA most commendably
and aggressively addresses such matters as: (i) insider/affiliated/nominee
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transactions; (ii) enhanced supervision, prudential requirements, and en-
forcement; (iii) emphasis on improving financial institution "govern-
ance;" and (iv) treatment of the role of external auditors and accounting
standards in financial institution supervision. In fact, the CBA endeavors
substantially to conform to current "international best practices."
In being "reactive," the draft CBA is (in a sense) understandably
"backward-looking;" that is, directed to shoring up the legal infrastruc-
ture from a crisis management perspective. This is not, however, to say
that there are no "forward-looking" aspects to the draft CBA, such as the
embrace of the "universal banking model" and consumer protection. The
modern realities of financial markets, instruments, and institutions, how-
ever, point to a rapidly changing financial environment requiring a "for-
ward-looking" approach which captures the ongoing rise of e-finance,
multifunctional banking, financial conglomerates, converging financial
markets and instruments, changing bank services/products, and rising
pressures from globalization and internationalization. While it may not
be realistic to attempt to address such matters in the CBA, these are mat-
ters of importance that will probably require legislative and/or regulatory
attention within the foreseeable future.
C. THE PROPOSED CBA AS A "FRAMEWORK" STATUTE
Draft No. 7 of the CBA (July 1999), as reviewed by this author, appears
to be largely a "framework" statute, that is, a statute that sets out the
broad areas of legislative coverage, but leaves most of the substantive
"details" to administrative rulemaking and discretion. This legislative ap-
proach is one legitimate way to approach statutory drafting because it
often results in a statute that is easier to pass in a divided political envi-
ronment, and provides considerable flexibility for the Thai government
and regulatory authorities to implement. In fact, this may well be the
best approach for the Thai government at this time, given current eco-
nomic and political circumstances in Thailand.
However, such an approach is problematic in several respects. First, it
can militate against a true "rule-based approach" as the rules are really
only "skeletal" and are dependent upon administrative/executive discre-
tion without judicial review. In addition, it cuts against international
trends towards increased transparency as there are no regular, visible and
predictable administrative procedures, no regular and prescribed admin-
istrative disclosure and publication, and no meaningful judicial review.
Much will depend on how effectively Thailand's new proposed adminis-
trative procedures and administrative court and legislation, and revised
practices and regulations of the BoT address these fundamental "proce-
dural due process" issues. In all events, the need for regular, transparent,




D. THE BoT AS BANK SUPERVISOR
In various visits to and lectures in Thailand over the past four years,
this author has consistently answered the question regarding the proper
structure of a bank supervisor with the response that there really is no
uniform, international model. There are a series of "pros and cons" that
need to be evaluated in the light of all of a country's particular circum-
stances and on the premise that emerging economies are fundamentally
different from industrialized nations.
With respect to Thailand, retaining the BoT as bank supervisor does
make sense given the economic and political circumstances in Thailand.
The BoT appears to be best suited at this stage of Thailand's economic
development to provide effective financial institution supervision and
regulation, although, other recent institutional structural models (e.g.,
UK "single regulator" approach and Japanese "FSA" approach) could
also be viable.51
However, as alluded to above, the enhancement of supervisory and
regulatory authority of the BoT should be accompanied by a high degree
of independence from undue political influence, resource sufficiency, and
accountability. As to independence, the DBTA and DBA appear to ade-
quately ensure insulation of the BoT from undue political influences.
The resources of the BoT are being enhanced both within and without
the current legislative initiatives. For the BoT to succeed in its laudable
supervision, examination and enforcement objectives, however, signifi-
cant additional resource support may well be in order. A separate, suffi-
ciently staffed, well-trained, and independent Financial Institution
Examination Section within the BoT, similar to the FSA Examination
Section developed in Japan, might be appropriate, as would an expanded
Enforcement Section. Further, the BoT could establish and develop
meaningful and coordinated linkages between various BoT departments/
sections and among interacting counterparts in other Thai government
agencies and foreign regulatory agencies, and with external industry and
academic groups.
In addition, a broad-based, active and informed BoT Court of Direc-
tors and Financial Institutions Policy Board are most desirable for ensur-
ing both transparency and accountability in the BoT.
In developing countries and transitional economies-countries which
are most in need of good banking supervision given their financial fragil-
ity in times of crises-the case for having both monetary and bank super-
visory responsibilities within the central bank is supported by other
arguments (in addition to the ones mentioned above). In particular,
there are advantages of synergy in placing banking supervision under the
umbrella of the central bank, due to the scarcity of qualified economists
51. See, e.g., Joseph J. Norton, Structuring the Banking Regulators and Supervisors:
Developed Country Experiences and their Possible Implications for Latin America and
Other Developing Countries, 4 NAFTA L. & Bus. REV. 5, 5-29 (1998).
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and financial experts, the shortage of financial instruments to hedge fi-
nancial risks, the lack of sophisticated accounting standards and practices,
and the difficulties in establishing appropriate co-ordination between va-
rious agencies (in this case between the central bank and a separate su-
pervisory agency).
In the case of Thailand, it is advisable for the BoT to be in charge of
both monetary policy and banking supervision. However, the delegation
of responsibility in the supervisory arena neither implies nor requires that
the central bank should be independent from government in the exercise
of these supervisory responsibilities. It is perfectly possible to restrict in-
dependence exclusively to the monetary policy functions of a central
bank, leaving other central bank functions-e.g., banking supervision-
under political control.
What does it mean to be independent in supervision? An analogy with
the independence of the central bank in monetary policy is helpful to
understand this issue. In order to carry out these responsibilities, a cen-
tral bank must have control over monetary policy. Control in this context
has two senses. First, it must have the technical capacity and the re-
sources (human and otherwise) to meaningfully control or influence mon-
etary conditions. Secondly, there is control in the sense of being able to
exercise the bank's own best judgment, which in turn is linked to the rules
regarding appointment and dismissal procedures, terms of office, budget-
ary autonomy and liaisons with the MoF. A central bank is truly a central
bank, and not just the monetary agent of government, when it is free to
make and implement decisions.52
However, in a democratic community independence is only one side of
the coin, for accountability is also necessary. To begin, it is important to
point out that authority is not given away, but "delegated." A clearly
specified mandate is given by parliament, and the agency to whom the
mandate is given, be it the central bank or another agency, is then left to
get on with carrying it out. In addition, it should be stressed that account-
ability requires, at the very least, that the central bank explain and justify
its decisions and actions and account for the decisions made in the execu-
tion of its responsibilities. Lawyers and economists tend to emphasize
different issues in attempting to measure accountability. Lawyers empha-
size the institutional dimension, i.e., the placing of the institution (the
independent central bank) within the existing system of checks and bal-
ances, in relation to the three branches of the State: legislative, executive
and judiciary.
The concept of accountability-from a legal perspective-should be
"diversified" to include parliamentary accountability as well as judicial
review of the central bank's acts and decisions, and a degree of co-opera-
tion with the executive branch to ensure consistent overall economic
policymaking.




In a national context, Parliament remains sovereign in its legislative
decisions, and one statute proclaiming central bank independence can al-
ways be removed by another one revoking it. Parliamentary accountabil-
ity should be exercised through a variety of procedures and mechanisms,
including annual reports and appearances of the Governor and other offi-
cials on a regular basis, and also in the case of an emergency situation.
Judicial review of the BoT's decisions and actions (conducted by an
independent and depoliticized judiciary or special and independent ad-
ministrative judicial committee) is essential to prevent and control the
arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of discretionary powers. This is a
fundamental element of the rule of law. The discretion of central bank-
ers-or any other officials-should never remain unfettered but instead
should be subject to legal controls.
In concluding that it is desirable for the central bank to conduct bank-
ing supervision in Thailand, it is important to consider a related issue.
What should be the relationship between the central bank (or the bank-
ing regulator) and other financial regulators, in particular securities and
insurance regulators? The answer is not straightforward. In the U.S.,
regulatory competition among various financial regulators is considered
to be a good institutional solution to the increasing complexity and so-
phistication of financial transactions and financial actors. The U.K., on
the other hand, has opted for a mega-regulator for all financial services
and markets, and considers that this single regulator is the best option to
deal with financial conglomerates and the increasing blurring of frontiers
between different types of financial businesses. Some smaller countries,
such as Norway, have also adopted the single regulator model. Whenever
this model has been adopted, the central bank has relinquished its super-
visory powers, i.e., the single regulator has been typically placed outside
the central bank. In a 1999 survey of 123 countries conducted by Profes-
sor David Llewellyn, only the Netherlands Antilles, Singapore and Uru-
guay had supervision of banking, insurance and securities within the
central bank. There are economic reasons for having the single financial
supervisor-if that is the preferred institutional arrangement-outside
the central bank. On the economic front, the central bank would need to
develop business and consumer protection rules that go beyond its core
competence of monetary policy and systemic oversight. On the political
front, the granting of excessive power to the central bank is undesirable
and potentially dangerous (if not matched by appropriate mechanisms of
accountability).
In summary, the proposed solution of entrusting the BoT with both
monetary and banking supervisory powers is sensible. However, other
financial supervisory powers (over securities and insurance firms) should
be entrusted to a different agency or agencies. In addition, the granting
of independence to the BoT-which should be further clarified to cast
some light on whether independence in monetary policy is accompanied
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by independence in banking supervision-must be matched by appropri-
ate mechanisms of accountability.
E. BoT ADMINISTRATIVE AND REGULATORY
IMPLEMENTATION PROCESSES
Two of the major "environmental" changes being brought about by the
current Thai banking law reform program are the enhanced indepen-
dence of and primary supervisory responsibilities for the BoT. These
changes are being effected, in large measure, under "framework" statutes
granting the BoT a broad range of regulatory and supervisory discretion.
"International best practices" would indicate that the BoT should care-
fully review and revise its current administrative practices through formal
regulations. The aim of such regulations should be, to ensure the devel-
opment of an administrative process that is regular, transparent, fair and
reviewable.
Thailand is currently considering major reforms to its general adminis-
trative procedures, including the possible establishment of an Adminis-
trative Court. These efforts are to be commended and encouraged as
necessary counterparts to the CBA.
The BoT should view the current circumstances as an opportunity to
take a forward-looking approach to upgrading substantially its current
administrative processes and procedures. For example, the BoT might
wish to consider issuing formal regulations setting forth the parameters of
its administrative processes. These regulations might touch upon the
following:
- Prior notice of all proposed Regulation and solicitation of exter-
nal comments,
- An interim period (except in emergency situations) between a
Regulation's enactment and its legal effect, so as to permit the
industry/society time to adjust,
- In the case of individual orders, meaningful opportunity (not sim-
ply at the examination level) for affected parties to respond,
- Regular and meaningful process for an administrative appeal of a
BoT order,
- General Gazette publication requirement for all regulations, no-
tices, and orders (note here that a general provision could be ad-
ded to the DBA), and
- Expanded and timely use of the BoT's internet website to create
greater transparency as to BoT decisions and actions (here the
author makes a favorable note that the BoT has already made
great steps in this area).
As to the extensive BoT Regulatory Implementation Process that will
be required under the CBA, it is critically important to get this process
"right." The BoT, with the assistance of the World Bank, will be seeking
outside technical assistance in this matter. While this is certainly a posi-
tive approach, the presence of external assistance should not relieve the
BoT from taking primary responsibility for its regulatory program. Re-
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gardless of the approach taken, the legal effect of a new CBA (as distin-
guished from its passage) should be aligned with the substantial
completion of the related regulatory program.
F. INFORMATION GATEWAYS/SHARING AS TO OTHER DOMESTIC AND
INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISORS
No provisions currently exist in the proposed CBA regarding informa-
tion-sharing, cooperation, and coordination by and between BoT and (1)
other domestic agencies; and (2) international counterpart agencies in
countries or regions where Thai financial institutions have a presence or
where foreign financial institutions have a presence in Thailand. The ex-
istence of "information gateways" regarding transfer of information in
appropriate circumstances is an important aspect of financial institution
regulation and supervision. In Thailand, domestic information gateways
should be established in the draft CBA between the BoT and the Thai
MoF, SEC, and insurance regulators, and criminal prosecution officials
with respect to money laundering and financial fraud activities. These
gateways should attempt to establish precisely when information regard-
ing financial institution affairs is to be disclosed outside of the BoT, and
the instances in which economic or financial information Thailand or
other entities not regulated by the BoT should be disclosed to the BoT.
This is especially pertinent given that the draft CBA establishes ."financial
business groups" that could well include non-financial institutions subject
to the functional regulation of another regulatory agency, and that troub-
led financial institutions close to being placed in receivership may be ad-
dressed in a manner using public funds under the draft DIA, which may
necessarily involve the MoF and Thai Government. With regards to in-
ternational arrangements, international information gateways should be
established in the CBA which expressly authorizes the BoT to disclose
certain information and otherwise coordinate with regulatory counter-
parts in other nations with interests relevant to Thai financial institutions
or markets. The Basle Committee and IOSCO have provided ample gui-
dance in this area, which should be reviewed prior to drafting any CBA
provisions in this area. The provisions in Hong Kong's Banking Ordi-
nance could be instructive in this regard.
G. JUDICIAL LINKAGE
As mentioned throughout this working volume, effective law reform
goes well beyond the drafting and implementation of statutes and regula-
tions. A responsive, well-trained judiciary in the banking law/regulation
area is also required. In this respect, Thailand is considering the possibil-
ity of a new Administrative Court. This is most commendable, but the
problem of maintaining well-trained judges in financial law matters is still
a matter to be addressed, as it would be ideal to have set administrative
judges trained in handling these matters. More generally, the BoT should
take a proactive approach in interacting with the relevant judicial training
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authorities to help promote a better understanding of the bank regulatory
processes. 53
H. BROADER SOCIETAL EDUCATIONAL NEEDS
Recognizing that the BoT does not have unlimited resources, the au-
thor still believes the BoT can (and should) have a meaningful role to
play in meeting the broader educational needs of the Thai society in un-
derstanding the nature and importance of a sound bank regulatory envi-
ronment. The expanded use of the BoT website is one starting point.
Also, active collaboration with leading domestic, regional and interna-
tional academies/academics and "think-tanks", with domestic and foreign
industry associations, and with responsible NGOs representing other le-
gitimate, affected societal interests might be fostered by the BoT.
IV. ADDRESSING THE ENFORCEMENT ISSUE
A. IN GENERAL
The BoT has addressed the issue of enforcement in various institu-
tional ways. First and foremost, as mentioned above, the Litigation De-
partment was established in 1998 to deal with matters of enforcement.
Second, is the reform of various supervisory method and procedures dis-
cussed in Part III above. Third, is the revision of the internal structure of
the BoT. Fourth, is the establishment of external committees to monitor
the operations of the BoT.
The Litigation Department was established to draw a clear line of re-
sponsibility in litigation, additional to the normal quasi-judicial sanctions
conducted by the BoT. The Department deals with the law enforcement
process, especially bringing criminal actions to court against executives
and management staff of financial institutions who have incurred dam-
ages and losses fraudulently to the assets of financial institutions. Pres-
ently, there are about sixty to seventy on-going cases either under the
process of consideration by public prosecutors or under police investiga-
tion. Other aspects of change include the employment of some high-
ranking prosecutors to head the Department, providing equipment sup-
port (such as photocopying machines, etc.) and general financial support
to facilitate the working process for police and prosecutor, and arranging
inter-agency seminars and sending out legal officers to participate in ex-
ternal seminars about litigation techniques and process particularly on fi-
nancial fraud. Furthermore, there have been internal working groups
within the BoT for legal officers and examiners to develop a common
understanding for detecting and starting up litigation process.
The process of litigation begins by the discovery of non-compliance or
violation of regulations by the Examination Department. To ensure that
it is genuinely non-compliant, the Examination Department refers the
53. See MacLean, supra note 8.
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case to the Legal Department. The case is then taken to the Litigation
Department to determine the next course of action. Usually, a fine is
assessed according to an internal scale of fines. The fine is communicated
between the BoT, the Public Investigator, and the MoF which is then
passed on to a committee set up by the Litigation Department to decide
on the final fine. Serious cases are first referred to the Public Investiga-
tor. The Public Investigator, Police and the Litigation Department coop-
erate to conduct any prosecutions. Some extraditions of fraudulent
management have been conducted, which will pose a further warning
against potential criminals.
The Examination Department has undergone some of the most signifi-
cant reforms since the financial crisis. They have revised various aspects
of the supervisory processes in order to achieve "international best prac-
tices" for bank supervision.
Since the lack of a clear asset classification has intensified the problems
of enforcement, it is being addressed by not only publication of the classi-
fication, but also by comparative research in the various methods of other
central banks and bank supervisors. The frequency of on-site examina-
tion is now also ensured to be annual. While the Examination Depart-
ment has sought to achieve annual on-site examination, it was not always
possible due to workload restraints. Since the financial crisis, the number
of financial institutions has been halved, now allowing annual inspection
to be carried out.
Supervision will also include aspects such as the financial institution
procedures which were not previously inspected. Lending practices,
back-office operations, and internal guidelines and rules of financial insti-
tutions will be scrutinized so as to ensure that the rules that are laid out
are not only international standards, but are also followed.
The Examination Department is also reforming its own supervisory
methods. Research on the best supervisory method and training of exam-
iners are some examples. The contents of the training course emphasizes
the aspects which are being strongly advocated by the Examination De-
partment. This includes teamwork and cooperation in supervision, which
is the final training course examiners must take in order to become an
approved examiner. 54
The BoT has restructured all departments to shorten the decision-mak-
ing process. As a result, there is less hierarchy in the institution ensuring
more speedy decisions. The BoT is a public institution that is plagued by
the bureaucratic processes required in such an institution. A central bank
is unique from other public institutions because of its dealings with the
financial market. This will not just require it to ensure that its decisions
54. The five courses of the examiners' training school are the following: 1) general
accounting of financial institutions (CAMEL), 2) overall financial institution analysis, 3)




are sound and accountable, but necessitates the process to eradicate as
much red tape as possible (i.e., bureaucratic "streamlining").
Three committees are being established to monitor the operations of
the BoT. The BoT will be accountable to these committees that will be in
charge of monetary policy, money market operations, and general affairs.
The Monetary Policy Board will decide on the official discount rate of the
central bank periodically. The Money Market Committee will meet on a
day-to-day basis to preserve financial stability of the market. The Gen-
eral Affairs Committee will look into various operational issues of the
BoT. Monetary policy decisions were formerly in the sole hand of the
Governor. But, there was no statute to ensure that his decision was
sound or accountable. The BoT is in the process of adopting more formal
inflation targeting, and the establishment of the Monetary Committee is a
step in this direction.
Despite the recent commendable efforts of the BoT, there is still scope
for further improvement that would encourage better operations and
would provide incentives for the subjects of the regulation/supervision to
abide by the new "rules." One such improvement would be the develop-
ment of a process of communication between the MoF and the BoT.
There is currently a vacuum of legal justification in certain activities of
the BoT, leaving uncertainty to some of its operations. By formalizing
the responsibilities and decision-making process between the two institu-
tions, issue conflicts could be more easily and readily resolved.
The BoT must also expand its accountability by way of reporting to a
democratically elected body. It currently reports to an external commit-
tee that comprises mainly of the MoF officials. Although there is a strong
view in Thailand that a parliamentary committee would not sufficiently
understand monetary policy to be able to determine its soundness, it is
the central bank's responsibility to improve its reporting techniques so as
to gain the understanding of any party. In most cases, while the under-
standing of monetary policy will not be initially advanced with experi-
ence, parties will gain knowledge and understand the intricacies of
monetary policy.
As for the enforcement process per se, a review of the internal fine
scale is necessary. The particular fine imposed on a financial institution
in case of non-compliance should have the effect of correcting wrongdo-
ing and inhibiting the possibility of repetition. Thus, the fine should be
high enough to create an incentive to permanently correct its activities,
but not too high that it erodes the capital base of the financial institution.
The BoT's scale for fines has not been revised for many years and the
BoT concedes that the old (but current) scale does not pose an effective
sanction against financial institutions. Frequent revision of the scale is
not necessary unless the inflation rate is high, but periodic revision to
ensure that it provides sufficient incentives for rehabilitation is necessary.
Also, as to the supervisory process, meaningful examination should be
made into the management of financial institutions. Currently, manage-
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ment of a financial institution is not interviewed during supervision to
hear their strategy and to assess the soundness of their views. The only
occasion in which examiners meet with the management of a financial
institution is after a summary of the examination has been compiled, and
a meeting is convened to convey the contents of it. The attitude and mo-
rale of financial institution management is a key element for the examin-
ers to better understand the working of the institution, and to determine
the mood and performance of the employees as well. Although it is diffi-
cult to ascertain the character of an institution's director and how this will
affect the institution, a meeting with directors may direct an examiner to
where some of the inadequacies of operations might arise.
B. EDUCATIONAL DIMENSIONS
Enforcement cannot be fully implemented unless there is awareness
not only among the responsible institutions, but also by the general pub-
lic. This requires an educational process that facilitates an increase in the
knowledge of the operations of a financial institution, how it affects the
conduct of others, and the consequences of improper or deficient opera-
tion. In relation to the overall Thai financial sector reform program,
three parties are the main subject of this educational process: members of
the BoT staff, of the financial institutions, and of the general public.
The education of members of BoT staff is being addressed through two
conduits: the training school for examiners and new public relations ef-
forts of the BoT. As explained above, the training school not only fo-
cuses on technical issues, but also coordination issues. All this is aimed to
improve the communication between examiners and other BoT staff
members. In terms of PR, there is a new BoT mission statement, which
addresses three issues: the structure, engineering and culture of BoT.
The "culture" dimension is to be an educational process to improve the
current poor coordination and communication in the BoT. This emphasis
of "teamwork and cooperation" is to be contrasted with its deficiency in
the past, which has obstructed a better understanding of the true state of
the financial sector. Inter-department communication was limited and
understanding of other department's operation has been minimal.
Further, members of the BoT staff need to grasp the direction toward
which the Thai and the global financial systems are moving. Without a
clear idea of what kind of financial sector they want, it is difficult to con-
duct effective research or to consider policies that will have an effect into
the future. Circulating the Governor's speeches, internal policy memos
on prospects of the financial sector, and memos/papers of international
experts, is important in this respect.
Financial institutions need also to be aware of the consequences of
their actions. The disclosure of supervisory results is an effective and low
cost way to achieve this. Currently, only serious violations are being pub-
lished, and only in an informal way. Publication of all non-compliances
should be considered since the adverse impact on an institution's public
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image will be a powerful incentive for financial institutions to operate
soundly. Disclosure of the minutes of the Monetary Policy Board should
also be considered so as to enhance the accountability of the monetary
policy role. Disclosure to a parliamentary committee might also be
considered.
As for the general public, there is an overall lack of public understand-
ing of the nature and significance of monetary policy, and of the opera-
tions of the central bank and bank supervision. Many central banks are
characterized by their mystified nature, and the BoT is no exception.
Members of BoT staff acknowledge that those who understand monetary
policy outside BoT are extremely limited. This should not be left in this
state since the central bank has a responsibility to promote its policies
and to enhance the understanding of its raison d'etre. Unless the central
bank's existence is supported by the general public, it will be difficult to
conduct effective monetary and supervisory policies.55
The BoT should support the education of the general public by disclos-
ing information on its operations and policies, and by holding seminars
for the public. Publication of user-friendly, but meaningful brochures are
another method of promoting the public understanding.
As long as the central bank exists in a democratic society, its public
nature should require it to be accountable to the general public. Al-
though this significance may seem diminished in terms of policy-formula-
tion, the long-term consequences of neglect to public understanding
could result in loss of regulatory power and broader governmental
credibility.
C. ENFORCEMENT AND GOOD GOVERNANCE
The draft new CBA provisions, taken collectively, generally represent a
meaningful approach to enforcement and good governance, but could be
further revised to ensure that the proper incentives exist for the BoT to
develop an "Enforcement Section" (not simply a Litigation Department)
and to implement/utilize these provisions accordingly. The premise be-
hind enforcement provisions and mechanisms for formal or informal en-
forcement actions is to establish an environment of "good governance"
within the financial institution system.
As such, the enforcement provisions and mechanisms for enforcement
action should be balanced so as not to preclude individuals with requisite
expertise from avoiding positions as directors or managers because of
fears of potential liability under nebulous statutes. For instance, the U.S.
banking agencies were plagued with various instances of directors and
managers engaging in fraudulent or abusive activities that were "unsafe
and unsound" with respect to depository institutions during the 1980s,
particularly with respect to the S&L industry crisis. Although many rea-
55. Some have advocated that the reputation of the central bank is essential for an
effective monetary policy. See e.g., Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, Rules, Discretion
and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy, 12 J. OF MONETARY ECON. 101 (1983).
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sons other than "insider" fraud and abuse contributed heavily to the de-
mise of the thrift industry, the U.S. congressional response (conveniently)
focused on such fraud and abuse in enacting legislation under the Finan-
cial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 ("FIR-
REA") and the Bank Fraud Act of 1990. The U.S. legislation granted the
banking agencies acting in various capacities, including conservator or re-
ceiver, numerous new and enhanced enforcement powers over financial
institutions and individuals associated with them.56
Thus, the U.S. banking agencies have a range of enforcement powers,
including cease and desist orders, removal, prohibition and civil money
penalty assessment authority, now over certain financial institutions and
"institution-affiliated" parties, including controlling shareholders. The
term "institution-affiliated party" has been expanded to include indepen-
dent attorneys, appraisers, and accountants, as well as other "indepen-
dent contractors" who knowingly or recklessly participate in any law or
regulatory violation, any breach of fiduciary duty, or any unsafe and un-
sound practice that causes or is likely to cause more than a minimal finan-
cial loss to or a significant adverse effect on a financial institution. The
U.S. banking agencies are authorized to issue regulations further defining
which individuals should be considered as institution-affiliated parties
due to their participation in the conduct of the affairs of an institution.
The receiver institutions (primarily the FDIC as receiver or another en-
tity so established by Congress to recover assets of failed banks, such as
the Resolution Trust Corporation) were further authorized under FIR-
REA to pursue certain "insiders" in civil litigation for damages caused to
their institutions under the "gross negligence" standard. 57
The BoT needs to develop an adequate "enforcement framework" be-
yond simply articulating fines and penalties for violations of various sec-
tions for any violations of particular statutes and BoT regulations. In
particular, the BoT could establish this "Enforcement Section" to enforce
the DBA provisions. This Enforcement Section would need to be pro-
vided with a range of statutory enforcement tools available to address
such violations, and to receive appropriate training and policy guidance
so as to be able to exercise appropriate discretion in using them, given the
facts and circumstances of particular cases. Most importantly, in order
for an Enforcement Section to be effective, the BoT would have to pro-
vide adequate legal and financial resources and training. The Enforce-
ment Section would necessarily need to be in close coordination with the
BoT Supervision and Examination Sections, and in liaison with govern-
ment prosecutors, to enforce violations and deficiencies uncovered
through the supervisory process.
56. See generally Daniel B. Gail & Joseph J. Norton, A Decade's Journey from 'Der-
egulation' to 'Supervisory Reregulation': The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and




An Enforcement Section should generally be capable of uncovering vi-
olations of law, regulation, or other unsafe and unsound practices of vari-
ous financial institution employees or affiliated parties, and is required to
aggressively undertake some type of enforcement action to correct any
deficiencies or address violations as appropriate, before such violations or
practices seriously jeopardize the financial institution or affect the Thai
financial system. The penal provisions should be triggered by the En-
forcement Section for violations or practices that merit more serious con-
sequences, subject to an expedited administrative review process which
gives parties the opportunity to present their case to the BoT and MoF.
As suggested above, the BoT and MoF should draft a binding agreement
(MOU) which establishes how the enforcement process will proceed.
D. PROMPT CORRECTIVE ACTION (PCA)
The PCA terminology is derived from the U.S. regulatory and legisla-
tive responses to the most severe series of banking and thrift crises exper-
ienced in the U.S. since the 1930s. In enacting the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 ("FDICIA"), the U.S.
Congress established the PCA scheme which imposed severe restrictions
on the operation of under-capitalized, federally insured financial institu-
tions. The PCA scheme also provided banking and thrift agencies with
broadened powers to impose additional limitations and sanctions on such
institutions. The PCA scheme also imposed restrictions on regulatory
discretion by limiting the extent the regulators could assist troubled insti-
tutions on a non-transparent basis. The overall policy of the U.S. PCA
scheme is to protect the government-insured deposit funds and the tax-
payers. The draft CBA proposes a modified PCA scheme.58
E. EXIT POLICIES
The draft CBA establishes basic policies and procedures for ordering a
financial institution to be placed "under control" of a "Control Commit-
tee", and procedures for the Control Committee to submit a "project for
rectification" to the BoT to recommend whether or not the financial insti-
tution should continue its business operations. The BoT authority to re-
voke licenses of financial institutions introduces the assumption that such
revocations will result in the liquidation of the respective financial institu-
tions. The draft CBA provides that the withdrawal of licenses results in
such institutions being liquidated in accordance with "the law on deposit
insurance institution." However, the draft CBA generally fails to estab-
lish any meaningful "exit" criteria, policies, and processes. The DIA will
likely not be enacted for several years. Thus, the CBA will have to inter-
face, as to exit policies, with the existing Thai interim, emergency decrees.
For a new modern statute, such a situation would prove problematic, at
58. See, e.g., G. N. OLSON, BANKS IN DISTRESS: LESSONS FROM THE AMERICAN EXPE-
RIENCE OF THE 1980s, ch. 11 (2000).
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least until the inactment of a modern DIA.59
F. CONSOLIDATED AND CONGLOMERATE SUPERVISION
Once an institution has been authorized to carry on any particular fi-
nancial activity, it is necessary to ensure that it conducts its activities in a
prudent and safe manner on a continuing basis thereafter. This is neces-
sary to protect the interests of current and potential depositors and other
creditors, as well as the stability of the banking and financial system as a
whole, against the risk of contagion and systemic collapse. The objective
of supervision is to allow the authorities to confirm that particular institu-
tions are either conducting themselves in accordance with accepted stan-
dards of market practice or more specific statutory or administrative
provisions designed to limit the financial exposures generated by their
activities. Supervision is accordingly a monitoring or review process
which ensures that financial institutions comply with recognized market
standards or more specific regulatory provisions.
Supervision may be effected through a number of parallel processes
which generally operate on an informal basis although they are backed by
statutory powers in number of specific regards. To ensure that such super-
vision is complete and effective in modern markets, however, financial
institutions must be examined on an individual (or "solo") as well as
group (or consolidated) basis. This is necessary to ensure that full account
is taken of all group or other connected relationships or exposures which
may exist within increasingly complex financial group structures.
Since the mid-1970s, consolidated supervision has become an essential
part of bank supervisory practice in many countries. Consolidation is
also used in the other areas, such as securities business, in some countries.
Although bank supervisors and securities regulators within the EU in-
creasingly rely on consolidated supervision (with sometimes no solo su-
pervision being undertaken at all), most insurance regulators and certain
securities regulators, for example, in the US, prefer "solo-plus" supervi-
sion. "Solo plus" supervision involves the supervision of an institution on
a solo basis initially only but with some adjustment subsequently being
undertaken to reflect the other group relationships which exist. This may
be preferred due to the perceived disadvantages involved with consolida-
tion which include additional costs, the possibility of supervisory involve-
ment in non-financial activities and the combination of distinct balance
sheets to which different prudential requirements are applied. 60
The main difficulty which arises with regard to consolidated and solo
plus supervision, however, is that they are both based on legal structures
and relationships. In modern financial markets, business structures within
59. Cf. GILLIAM GARCIA, DEPOSIT INSURANCE AND CRISES MANAGEMENT (IMF
Working Paper WP/00/57, Mar. 2000); GILLIAN Garcia, DEPOSIT INSURANCE-A SURVEY
OF ACTUAL AND BEST PRACTICES (IMF Working Paper WP 99/54, Apr. 1999).
60. For a general background on financial conglomerates, see, e.g., George A. Walker,
The Law of Financial Conglomerates: The Next Generation, 30 INT'L LAW. 57 (1996).
[Vol. 55
INFRASTRUCTURAL LAW REFORM
groups are increasingly set up on product, regional grouping or some
other management unit rather than a purely legal entity basis. The orga-
nizational structure of the group in economic or management terms will
then have little relationship with its legal or corporate structure. For this
reason, the authorities in such countries as the United Kingdom are de-
veloping new forms of supervision based on an examination of significant
business units within a single company or group of companies and not
just with legal entities.
This new management unit centered form of bank supervision is not
designed to replace but to supplement the more traditional consolidated
(legal entity) type of supervisory practice. While this has now been fully
incorporated into standard United Kingdom supervisory processes it is
still not used extensively elsewhere. It is, however, to be expected that it
will be become IBP throughout the world within the next two to five
years.
The other most significant recent development which has occurred has
been the need to extend the existing forms of solo or partial consolidated
supervision which exist to deal with the even more complex financial and
mixed financial and commercial or industrial conglomerate group struc-
tures which have emerged. This has proved to be very difficult in light of
the distinct nature of the underlying systems of supervision which exist in
each of the three principal financial sectors of banking, securities and in-
surance. While some progress has been possible within Europe, for exam-
ple, in bringing investment firms within the scope of bank consolidation,
little further progress has been possible in this area. The issue has been
considered at the international level by the Joint Forum on Financial
Conglomerates and a number of papers have been produced. Most of
these are, however, superficial in their terms and none have as yet been
implemented at the national level.61
The final CBA should reflect best supervisory practice currently in op-
eration elsewhere as well as include adequate provision to allow for fu-
ture developments in this area to be given effect in Thailand in as quick
and flexible a manner as possible.
The proposed provisions concerning consolidated supervision as set out
in the draft CBA empower the Bank of Thailand to conduct examinations
and supervision on a consolidated basis. The companies within the group
are required to comply with the rules, procedures and conditions laid
down by the Bank which may also impose additional capital requirements
on group companies. Here, again, the drafting of comprehensive regula-
tions will be essential.
V. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
Clearly, the realities of effective banking law reform demand a mean-
ingful and relevant "factoring-in" of the sundry sui generis dimensions
61. Supervision of Financial Conglomerates, BASEL COMM. PuB. No. 47 (1999).
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presented by a specific economy and society. Even, more clearly the fo-
cal point for insuring effective financial sector reform consistent with in-
ternational best practices rests with the domestic reform process. As to an
emerging economy such as Thailand, it is in the process of creating a
financial sector legal infrastructure that adheres to international stan-
dards. With the passage of key legislation whether the Thai Parliament
will confirm the institutional setting for an independent central bank, as
determiner of monetary policy and as bank supervisor, will be a most
telling sign to the financial markets and international community. In all
events, the final reforms should lead to a practical supervisory regime
based on international best practices. For example, stakeholders' inter-
ests will be controlled by more stringent lending limits, insider/affiliate
transaction restraints and related penalties.
The Thai judicial system has also been improving with a new Constitu-
tion and bankruptcy court. Yet, the absence of a modern administrative
procedure (without appropriate judicial review) for the BoT rulemaking
remains a serious deficiency, if a more rule-based, rule of law approach to
reform is to be achieved.
It would be premature to say that the legal infrastructure of the finan-
cial system in Thailand is reformed and that foreign investors can now
expect the same "safety and soundness" of the advanced economies.
Thailand is still in the process of fostering a credit culture, which is a key
for enforcement to be effectively and efficiently carried out. A sound
credit culture is also a foundation for a better and more widespread un-
derstanding of the reform process, and helps educate those involved in
evaluating financial institutions through performance on the basis of po-
litical connections.
Independence of the central bank (if accepted by Parliament in the
final legislation) must also be democratically supported by disclosure of
its operations and reporting to an independent body. The current frame-
work does not envisage reporting to an elected body, which could be
problematic for the BoT. If the BoT is to adopt inflation targeting, re-
porting to an independent body should be seriously contemplated.
In any event, there is a clear need for wider disclosure of information.
Statistics of non-compliant cases or statements on individual violations
could be issued.62
The core bases for a viable financial infrastructure is readily at hand for
Thailand, if the Thai Parliament acts in the national and not vested inter-
ests. Then, it will depend on the relevant sections of the economy, the
politicians, the bureaucrats, the judiciary and the public as a whole to
62. In terms of broadening the understanding of the reform process by Thai society,
the BoT should take advantage of its website to disclose more detailed reports and infor-
mation of its operations and research conducted. It could hold seminars for the business
community, academic community and the general public on the formulation of its policies.
The problem of assessing the performance of a central bank and financial system lies with
the lack of information. More effort should be taken to gain a wider audience for its
publications in order to foster a better understanding of the rationale of its operations.
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alter their behavior vis-A-vis the reforms. The ultimate reforms need to
be "owned" by all sectors of the Thai economy and society, and not only
by the officials of the BoT and MoF. This may be a slow and tedious
process; but, if done rightly, an effective reform process should create a
"sound and safe" financial system with the robustness that is envisaged by
the international standards and best practices to which Thailand has com-
mitted to adhere.
In effect, the "organic" comparative methodology employed by Profes-
sor McKnight remains most relevant today as to the modern genre of
global infrastructural law reform-both in a retrospective and prospec-
tive context.
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